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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a model-based analysis of the effects of various capacity incentive 
systems on new investment in the Korean electricity market. The restructuring process 
in Korea allocated power generation to six firms, competing within a wholesale market, 
albeit strictly on a cost basis. Because of this cost-based pool, capacity payments were 
also introduced to encourage new investment. However, it is an open question whether 
the current fixed capacity payment scheme is enough to secure resource adequacy and 
consideration is being given to alternative mechanisms such as the use of LOLP. Using 
a detailed market simulation model, based on system dynamics, we compare these 
approaches in terms of how they may influence the investors’ decisions and thereby 
determine the system reserve margin. The simulation results suggest that there may be 
serious problems is staying with the current fixed capacity payments in order to achieve 
resource adequacy. In contrast an LOLP based capacity mechanism may, in the longer 
term, increase the reserve margin compared to a fixed capacity payment. More 
generally, this paper indicates how crucial the effective modeling of the investment 
behavior of the independent power producers is for adequate policy support, even if 
they only constitute a fringe in a substantially centrally influenced market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The government of South Korea has designed a cautiously staged progression towards 
full restructuring of its electricity sector, which it intends, ultimately, to culminate in full 
wholesale and retail competition. The nation is currently in an early stage of this process, 
where generation facilities have been allocated to six firms, who compete in a wholesale 
market, albeit strictly on a cost basis. However, the separation of distribution from the 
national utility, KEPCO, was halted after the California market crisis. To meet the 
growth in energy demand, resource adequacy continues to be a very fundamental and 
crucial political concern. Without firm central planning, there is no obligation on the 
generating companies to collectively maintain an adequate reserve margin, and so, 
whilst the government does produce a basic plan, this is only indicative based upon the 
reasonable, survey-based, inclinations of the firms to invest, together with some central 
estimates. New capacity investments in the 3
rd
 long term basic plan (2006) are displayed 
in Table 1, for the six main generating companies, plus independent power producers 
(IPPs). Although this indicative plan does provide some coercive pressure on the six 
main generating companies to the extent that they are subsidiaries of KEPCO, their 
autonomous requirements to achieve profitability means that they will still evaluate 
each investment on its merits at the time. Furthermore, new investment by the IPPs is 
always essentially opportunistic. Thus, overall there is considerable uncertainty in the 
plan, such that, for example, even compared to the 2
nd
 long term basic plan of 2004, 
there have already been several substantial delays and even cancellations. 
 As with most cost-based pools around the world, a fixed capacity payment was 
introduced to provide the additional financial return for new investment. The fixed 
payment system is controversial, however, as it is generally set in an ad hoc way for a 
period of time, not precisely and transparently linked to actual market conditions, and 
therefore presents an additional element of regulatory risk to market participants.  
Hence, an alternative, explicit formulaic approach, such as a linkage to the periodic loss 
of load probability, LOLP, has theoretical appeal and some market attraction. Although 
the dynamic properties of the LOLP based approach have been modeled before (eg 
Bunn and Larsen, 1992), a direct comparison with fixed payments remains under-
researched. 
 
 
 
Table 1. The 3
rd
 basic plan for new capacities (2006~2020), MW 
KHNP KOSEP KOMIPO WP KOSPO KEWESPO IPPs 
Year 
hydro nuclear coal coal oil LNG coal LNG coal oil LNG coal coal oil LNG 
2006 - - - - - - - - - - - 500 - 14.3 989.2 
2007 - - - - - - 500 - - 200 - 500 - - - 
2008 - - 870 500 - - 500 - - - - 500 - 664.9 500 
2009 - - - 500 40 - - - 1,870 - - - - - 500 
2010 - - - - - - - 700 - - - - 200 953.2 - 
2011 60 1,000 - - - 500 - - - - 900 - 200 747.3 2,000 
2012 - 2,000 - - - 500 - - - - - - - 100.3 2,250 
2013 - 1,000 - - - 700 - - - - - - - - 300 
2014 - 1,400 870 - - - - - - - - 1000 - - 700 
2015 - 1,400 870 - - - - - - - - 1000 - - - 
2016 - 1,400 - - - - - 300 - - - - - - - 
2017 - 1,400 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2018 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2019 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2020 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Capacity 33,599.2 
 
 Thus, in this study, a simulation model based on system dynamics is developed in 
order to analyze the effects of different capacity payments on investment decisions and 
hence the system reserve margin. Two cases are considered for this study. In the first, 
the reserve margin together with wholesale prices and fuel mix are estimated for a fixed 
capacity payment system. And in the second case, the reserve margin, wholesale prices 
and fuel mix were calculated with an LOLP based system. Then, these results are 
compared with the 3
rd
 long term basic plan developed by the government. Even though 
new plants are included in the 3
rd
 long term basic plan, if the expected return on 
investment is lower than their criteria, the companies will cancel or delay the new 
investment. In our model, we recognize that different investment criteria may be applied 
depending on technology and type of company, and a survey was undertaken to identify 
this aspect. 
 This paper is organized as follows; Section 2 gives an overview of the Korean 
wholesale power market and investigates some issues of the current fixed capacity 
payments. Section 3 presents the results of survey conducted to find out how generating 
companies make their investment decisions. In Section 4, the system dynamics model is 
described and the experimental simulations are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
provides some conclusions.    
      
 
2. Capacity payments in the Korean electricity market 
 
 In the current cost-based pool, the revenue of a generating company is composed of 
both an energy-related, system marginal price (SMP) and a fixed capacity payment (CP). 
The wholesale market clearing price, i.e. system marginal price (SMP), is determined by 
the production cost of the marginal unit needed to meet demand in each hour from the 
aggregate supply function submitted to the market by all generators. The capacity 
payment (CP) is paid to all available plants, regardless of whether they are actually 
called upon to produce. In the Korean system, there are two market segments depending 
upon whether the plant is providing baseload or peaking capacity. There is a separate 
energy price for each, baseload marginal price (BLMP) and SMP, as well as separate 
capacity payments. The CP is the price paid to the generating units that have submitted 
their hourly available capacities and is based on the pre-determined hourly and seasonal 
values. In 2006, the base load CP (20.49 won/kWh) was derived from the capital and a 
fixed O&M cost of a most recently planned 500 MW coal unit, whereas the peak load 
CP (7.17 won/kWh) reflected the capital and a fixed O&M cost of a standard gas 
turbine peaking unit. Thus, the fixed CP in the Korean market was designed to recover 
the capital cost of each unit, which the energy prices (BLMP & SMP) do not remunerate. 
However, these fixed capacity payments are not related directly to the market conditions, 
especially overall and local reserve margin considerations. In the short term, according 
to the 3
rd
 basic plan, the reserve margin after 2011 will be over 20%, which may be 
excessive, but in the longer term, it is not clear that investment decisions will respond 
adequately to market conditions. 
  
 
3. Investors’ behavior in the Korean electricity market 
 
 A small representative series of interviews was conducted in order to acquire 
information regarding the investment decision-making criteria of the different 
generating companies. Table 2 summarizes the interview results.  
 
Table 2. Generating company investment criteria: Interview results 
Genco Nuclear company 5 fossil fuel companies IPPs 
Investment 
Decision 
KHNP can only invest if 
annual levelized cost of 
nuclear is lower than that of 
coal and LNG, but there are 
limitations due to site planning 
and the government’s policy. 
 
They would like to invest 
aggressively, but there are 
limitations due to site 
planning and the 
government’s regulation 
of the competitive market. 
 
Strategic investment 
intentions restrained 
due to difficulties in 
project financing and 
required return on 
investment. 
 
Target No target. It depends on 
government policy 
Maintaining current 
market share 
Growth and profits 
Required Rate 
of Return 
NA 7% 10% 
 
 
4. Model description 
 
4.1. Model overview 
 The model presented here was developed to analyze the effects of capacity payment 
systems on generators’ investment decisions. The model is based on system dynamics 
(SD), which is a branch of control and system theory applied to economical and 
managerial systems. Following Forrester (1961), the methodology
1
 of SD is based on 
identifying the structure of the system and the logic of the inter-relationships among the 
different components in order to explore its dynamic responses. Figure 1 shows a 
simplified causal-loop diagram of an electricity market investment cycle, following 
Bunn and Larsen (1992) with an LOLP capacity payments system. Causal relationships 
between two variables are identified by arrows. The positive (negative) sign at the end 
of each arrow can be understand as the response to a small positive change in the source 
variable creating a positive (negative) variation on the target variable. The diagram 
shows the essential balancing feedback that governs the long-run development of the 
electricity market. Recall that the wholesale market price is composed of the marginal 
energy price (BLMP/SMP) and a capacity payment (CP). Market revenues influence 
investment decisions, and the construction of new plants will affect total capacities 
generated in the electricity market. Since market prices are very sensitive to the reserve 
                                            
1 A complete and modern reference book on the SD methodology can be found in Sterman (2000). 
margin, not only does this feedback creates a very responsive loop, it also means that 
prices and investments are very dependent upon what other companies are doing.  
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Figure 1. Causal-loop diagram of the electricity market. 
 
  Figure 2 gives an overview of the conceptual framework for the model in this paper. 
The model has three sub-modules: a price module, a capacity mechanism module, and 
an investment decision module. These modules are linked together by system dynamics 
modeling for a year-by-year simulation, extending over 30~50 years. The objective of 
this study is to make an estimate of long-term prospects for the Korean electricity 
market based. Many assumptions are taken from the 3
rd
 basic long term plan, but we 
analyze the effects of different capacity mechanisms within this framework.  
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Figure 2. The conceptual framework for the SD model 
  
 In order that the modules could be developed and updated flexibly with detailed 
market data, the overall model was developed as a dynamic interaction of various Excel 
modules, controlled through Visual Basic programming.      
 
4.2. Price modules  
 This model is designed to reflect price formation in the current Korean cost based 
power pool. The price module is a core component in this model to determine SMP and 
calculate each company’s revenue from the energy market year by year. The output 
from this module is used as an input for the capacity mechanism module and the 
investment decision module. 
 The plants are aggregated into groups by technology and companies. Each year, the 
simulation shows the reserve margin, which is the difference between installed capacity 
and demand (expressed as a fraction of demand). The price module can determine a 
single market price as well as the dual BLMP/SMP pricing.   
 
4.3. Capacity mechanism module 
The capacity mechanism module considers the inclusion of LOLP based capacity 
payments, as an alternative to fixed capacity payments. LOLP based capacity payment 
is calculated from LOLP, the value of loss of load (VOLL), and SMP by equation (1) 
 LOLP based capacity payment = LOLP (VOLL – SMP)                     (1) 
 
 Each year, as the simulation advances, a comparison between demand and capacity is 
made in order to evaluate the LOLP. Depending upon the reserve margin, which is the 
difference between installed capacity and demand (expressed as a fraction of demand), 
LOLP can be computed as the convolution of the probabilities of failure of the 
individual plants in the system. Figure 3 presents an estimate of LOLP as a function of 
reserve margin in the Korean electricity market.  
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Figure 3. LOLP as a function of reserve margin 
 Following industry discussions, we assume VOLL as 3,000 won/kWh, whilst the 
LOLP based capacity payment depends upon reserve margin, as above. The basic idea 
of the LOLP based capacity payment is that, when there are periods of excess capacity, 
the system should have relatively high reserve margin and low LOLP, on average, and 
there should be little economic incentive to invest in new capacity. Alternatively, when 
there is heavy demand relative to available capacity, LOLP will rise steeply as reserve 
margin declines and this should provide the required investment incentive. 
 
4.4. Investment decision module 
 In the Investment module, it is assumed that investment will occur whenever the NPV 
of a new investment is positive or IRR is higher than the required rate of return (cost of 
capital). From the face-to-face interviews, it appeared that the six main generating 
companies will make a new investment if IRR is higher than 7% while IPPs will invest 
only if IRR is higher than 10%. However, as mentioned earlier, the strict implications of 
these for the nuclear and fossil power companies are dubious, because these are all 
subsidiaries of KEPCO, and ultimate subject to the politicized intent of the KEPCO 
board. However, the investment decisions of the IPPs are quite individualistic and profit 
motivated. Apart from cost of capital, advantageous sites for quicker new build and 
project financing can be important factors for an investment decision, but they are not 
considered in this study. The output from this module, as new capacity build, goes into 
the price module and influences the total installed capacity, market price, reserve margin 
and fuel mix. This change affects generating companies’ revenue again and hence the 
subsequent investment decisions are changed dynamically. These are therefore classic 
cyclic causal loops with feedback through the price module, the capacity mechanism 
module, and the investment decision module. 
 
 
5. Simulation Results  
  
The simulation was conducted for two cases and compared to the reference case.  
 
1. The reference case is a ‘base’ case assumption that all companies including IPPs will 
build or retire their plants according to the basic plan without any change. This case 
reflects the current energy market rule (BLMP/SMP) and capacity mechanism (fixed 
dual capacity payments). 
 
2. Case 1 presumes all companies will make investment decisions on their own criteria. 
They can delay or give up their planned construction if they decide that it isn’t 
profitable. The energy market and capacity mechanism are identical to the current 
market design (dual energy market prices and fixed dual capacity payments). 
 
3. Case 2 has different rules from the current market and allows companies to make 
their own investment decision. The market has a single energy market price (SMP) and 
LOLP based capacity payments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of cases in the model analysis 
 
Genco’s Investment 
Decision 
Energy Market Capacity Payment 
Reference 
Case 
No BLMP/SMP 
Fixed CP 
(Baseload CP & Peakload CP) 
Case 1 Yes BLMP/SMP 
Fixed CP 
(Baseload CP & Peakload CP) 
Case 2 Yes SMP 
LOLP based CP 
= LOLP(VOLL-SMP) 
 
5.1. Reference case 
 In the reference case, a year-by-year simulation (2006~2020) is developed with output 
graphs for market price, reserve margin, fuel mix, and market shares for generators, 
based on the government’s basic plan. The plants are aggregated into groups by 
technology (hydro, nuclear, domestic coal, coal, oil, and LNG) and generators (KHNP, 
KOSEP, KOMIPO, WP, KOSPO, KEWESPO, and IPPs).  
 According to the 3
rd
 basic plan, reserve margin is increasing to 25.1% shown in Figure 
4. On the assumption that the optimal reserve margin would be 14~18% in the Korean 
electricity market, the overinvestment of new capacity will have indeed become cause 
for concern after 2012. SMP is stable, however. Any changes in the fuel costs of oil and 
gas over the planning period were not considered in this model, otherwise SMP would 
follow them.  
 
64.1
63.0
62.560.8
62.864.165.5
66.565.665.763.8
60.2
61.962.362.6
20.418.519.9
16.6
13.514.113.3
10.7
10.0
22.5
24.0
25.1
24.2 23.5
22.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
SMP (won/kWh)
Reserve Margin (%)
SMP & Reserve Margin
Year  
Figure 4. SMP and reserve margin in the reference case 
 Figure 5 shows the prospects for fuel mix and these are consistent with the 
government’s guideline.  
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Figure 5. Fuel mix in the reference case 
 Figure 6 shows the market share profiles for the six main gencos and IPPs. KHNP, 
nuclear company, maintains a 30% market share in terms of the installed capacity. The 
IPPs increase market share, encouraged by the construction of new LNG plants, whilst, 
proportionally, the five fossil fuel companies decrease market share, mainly due to the 
retirement of oil and coal plants.  
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Figure 6. Market share (Installed capacity based) in the reference case 
 
5.2. Case 1 
  In Case 1, generating companies are allowed to make an investment decision on its 
own merits. The energy market and capacity mechanism are identical to the current 
market design (dual energy market price and fixed dual capacity payments). This model 
assumes that generating companies will not build new plants unless they estimate the 
IRR to be higher than the required rate of return.  
 The result of the simulation in this case shows that IPPs will decide not to build some 
of plants, while all the six main gencos follow the 3
rd
 basic plan without any change. 
The change of IPPs’ investment decision is shown in Figure 7. In this case, IPPs will 
abandon or delay building new plants in 2006, 2008, and 2014, and only build the two 
coal plants planned in 2010 and 2011, in the absence of further financial incentives. The 
changes of IPPs’ investment decision would have an effect on the system reserve margin 
shown in Figure 8, to the extent that it could cause an overall problem of reliable supply 
in the electricity market.  
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Figure 7. IPPs' investment decision in Case 1 
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Figure 8. Reserve margin in the Korean electricity market 
Thus, the fixed capacity payments paid to all the generating units that have submitted 
their available capacities do not seem to be efficacious for inducing generating 
company’s appropriate investments, especially the LNG plants of IPPs. Furthermore, we 
see how sensitive this market is to the behaviour of IPPs. 
 
5.2. Case 2 
 Case 2 also allows generating companies to make their own investment decisions. The 
market rule, however, is different from the current one. In this case, the market has a 
single energy market price (SMP) and a single LOLP based capacity payment. The 
result of the simulations in Case 2 shows that IPPs will still decide not to build some of 
plants, while all the six main gencos follow the 3
rd
 basic plan without any change as 
well. The change of IPPs’ investment is shown in Figure 9, where unlike Case 1, the 
IPPs do actually build many of plants planned.  
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Figure 9. IPPs’ investment decision in Case 2 
 
 The system reserve margin in Case 2 is presented in Figure 8. Although LOLP based 
CP was slow to change the investment and reserve margin in the initial stage of the 
overall period, however, it makes an appropriate response in the longer-term between 
the unrealistic over-investment indicated in the national plan, and the under-investment 
that might follow if the IPPs were only induced by the fixed capacity mechanism 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 A simulation model was developed to analyze the generating companies’ investment 
decisions and the long-run reliability of supply in the Korean electricity market. The 
model is based on a system dynamics approach, where investment behaviours are 
conditioned by dynamic feedback formed by market price and capacity payments. The 
simulation results show that major fossil and nuclear companies, still partially under the 
influence of central planning, construct the new capacity indicated in the latest national 
long term basic plan for both a fixed capacity payment and LOLP based capacity 
payment systems. However, although the national plan suggests substantial IPP building, 
and in fact our model indicates a rather excessive reserve margin if that were followed, 
our model also shows that so much IPP capacity is inconsistent with their stated 
investment criteria, and that the IPPs may under the investment under the current fixed 
CP mechanism. The wholesale price decreases due to the excess supply and it leads to 
lower the IRR of IPPs. The return is too low for IPPs to invest. This leads to very low 
system reserve margin and causes concern about the long-term security. However, the 
LOLP based CP mechanism shows some improvement in reserve margin in the longer 
term to an appropriate a sustainable level. 
 Clearly, such model-based results are only indicative, but they do raise substantial 
questions about current misplaced confidence in the fixed capacity payment system. 
Further detailed research is essential in the Korean context.  
 More generally, this model shows how important it is to understand the fringe players 
in power markets. Reserve margins are very sensitive to market prices, and market 
prices in turn are very sensitive to reserve margins. Even in a market such as Korea 
where liberalization is progressing slowly, with the major portion of the market still 
under central planning influence, the performance of the IPP fringe appears to be crucial. 
An inability to model them effectively would ultimately undermine the usefulness of 
any long-term market model and the consequent insights into energy security. 
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